In this essay I will firstly outline the main points of Dworkin's theory of equality of resources and then examine his rejection of the starting-gate theory of fairness. Dworkin's theory of equality of resources can be split up into a number of smaller points which are discussed in turn, namely the idea of an auction, the concepts of luck and insurance, and discussions of handicaps, and talents. I will assess each of these in turn and would argue that, although the idea of an auction as a fair way of equally distributing initial resources is persuasive, it is not clear that Dworkin's argument that some degree of sharing out the benefits of talents is necessary for equality is quite as convincing.
In discussing equality of resources Dworkin makes it clear that what he is primarily concerned with is equality of resources that are owned by individuals. What he is aiming to provide is a theory whereby equality of resources will be achieved within the context of an economic market. He makes it clear that such a market would not hinder this project, and indeed is an integral part of it. Dworkin uses an example of some immigrants washed up on a desert island to illustrate his theory, and the first question addressed is what the best way to divide the resources on the island equally and fairly would be. He employs what he calls the 'envy test' to assess whether a chosen distribution is equal or not. This test basically holds that:
No division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle." (P.285)
So according to the envy test, dividing the resources into identical portions and giving each person one such identical portion would not be an equal division of resources. This can be illustrated by a simple example of 10 people having to share out 10 apples and 10 pears. Suppose everyone was given one of each and 8 people are quite happy with this arrangement, liking both apples and pears to the same degree. However 2 people are unhappy because one hates apples and the other hates pears. It would seem sensible for them to swap so that the one who likes apples has two apples and vice versa. Hence equality of resources does not entail everyone having exactly the same things. The obvious next step to take would be a system whereby everyone is given an equal amount of tokens or money (which are not in themselves valuable) with which to acquire their fair share of the resources they would prefer. This is indeed the step Dworkin takes when he develops the idea of an initial auction to determine who gets what resources. This also overcomes the problem of people who envy no-one else's bundle but would have preferred an altogether different combination of resources in each bundle. In Dworkin's example of the immigrants on the island, they are all given an equal number of clam shells with which to buy the resources which they most want. This would obviously satisfy the envy test, since no-one will envy another person's resources because they could have bought exactly the same with their clamshells if they had wanted to. Obviously the resources will go to the highest bidder and so the price will be fixed by the demand there is for that particular resource. It can be argued that it seems unfair on those who share their tastes with many others, since there will be more competition to get what they want. However, this does not show that the distribution of resources is in fact unequal. Under a theory of equality of welfare the distribution of tastes and preferences would have to be taken into account, but since Dworkin has already rejected any theory of distribution grounded on the claims of welfare, this does not raise a problem for him. And indeed it seems intuitively right to claim that equality of resources will not ensure that everyone is equally satisfied with their lot, but that is not the end which the theory is trying to reach. As Dworkin puts it:
The contingent facts of raw material and the distribute of tastes are not grounds on which someone might challenge a distribution as unequal. They are rather background facts that determine what equality of resources, in these circumstances, is. (P.289)
I would agree with this claim and support the view that an auction is the only fair way to divide up initial resources so that they can be privately owned.
Dworkin now turns to a consideration of what would ensure that the distribution of resources in a particular society stays equal. It is obvious, as he points out, that the envy test would not be satisfied a number of years after the auction because people would use their resources in different ways and with differing degrees of success. Of course luck would play a role in determining the fortunes of the people in that society (the immigrants in the case of Dworkin's example). Dworkin here makes the important distinction between what he calls 'option luck' and 'brute luck', option luck being "a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out" and brute luck being "a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles". He accommodates for both of these types of luck by imagining a system of insurance that is available to the immigrants. It is then their own choice whether of not to insure against brute bad luck, a choice which itself rests on option luck (ie. whether or not the choice turned out to be profitable) So no interference would be permitted in an attempt to redistribute resources to someone who has suffered brute bad luck, because their resulting situation is a consequence of a calculated decision that they made not to insure against such an event. As Dworkin points out:
We have already decided that people should pay the price of the life they have decided to lead, measured in what others give up in order that they can do so. (P.294)
So it seems that option luck and brute luck can be accommodated and differences in material prosperity justified.
Dworkin goes on to discuss the special case of people with severe handicaps who we intuitively feel should be compensated in some way. This poses particular problems in that mental and physical powers are not resources in the same sense that material goods are in that they cannot be transferred from one person to another. This problem is overcome by Dworkin by way of a hypothetical insurance market based on what insurance premium people would have been prepared to pay had everyone run the same risk of being handicapped in a particular way. He makes the important distinction between handicaps and expensive tastes so that his theory will not justify redistribution to people who have expensive tastes, for whatever the reason. He says that handicaps in themselves lessen the resources available to that person, whereas a person with expensive tastes has no fewer resources at his disposal in virtue of that fact.
In the latter part of his paper, Dworkin addresses the question:
"Would the auction produce continuing equality of resources if (as in the real world) talents for production differed sharply from person to person?" (p.257)
He argues that if we insist on the envy test being a necessary component of equality then the answer to this question will be 'no'. But it can be objected that the envy test does not need to be met in order for equality of resources to be achieved and that:
The point of equality of resources ...is that people should have the same external resources at their command to make of them what, given these various features and talents, they can." (P.307)
Dworkin rejects this idea because he rightly points out that one person's prosperity may damage another, but assumes, perhaps misguidedly that this is undesirable and therefore those with fewer talents, and hence a diminished opportunity for economic prosperity, ought to be compensated. However, I do not feel that Dworkin gives any satisfactory arguments as to why we are required to pool talents, as it were. I do not find his rejection of the starting-gate theory as convincing as it might be. He makes the claim that the starting-gate theory is contradictory in requiring resources to be shared out equally initially but then requiring laissez-faire afterwards. His criticism rests on the claim that:
The moment when the immigrants first land is, after all, an arbitrary point in their lives at which to locate any one-shot requirement that they each have an equal share of available resources. If that requirement holds then, it must also hold on the tenth anniversary of that date." (P.309)
But is this claim obvious? I would argue that it is not. I would argue that the time when the immigrants first arrive on the island is not an arbitrary point in their lives, but rather a point when they are faced with resources that do not belong to anyone, which must somehow be divided up equally and fairly among everyone. This seems to me to be a distinct issue from the situation, say ten years down the line, when everything on the island is owned by someone and it does not seem obvious that in the latter case material resources must be redistributed equally.
Therefore to conclude I would agree with Dworkin's theory up to a point, that the auction is the only fair way of distributing goods equally in the first instance, but I would contend that his claim that this means constant redistribution is necessary to uphold equality of welfare is far from certain.
© Anne Witton 1996. No part of this article may be copied without my permission.
