Reading: Russell 'On Denoting' (Chap 16 in Martinich The Philosophy of Language)
Russell 'Descriptions' (Chap 17 in Martinich The Philosophy of Language)
Sainsbury in Grayling Philosophy (Section 2)
Greg McCulloch 'The Name of the Game' (Section 2 Parts 14 - 17)
Sainsbury 'Logical Forms' (Chapter 4 Sections 10 - 12)
In this essay I will firstly sketch what I take to be the basis of Russell's theory of descriptions. I will then examine how successful it is in solving the three puzzles which Russell claims only his theory can make sense of. I will conclude by turning to a consideration of some objections made of Russell's theory, particularly those made by Strawson, Donnellan and Peacocke, and examine whether Russell's theory can be defended against these criticisms. I will argue that Russell's theory is indeed the correct way of thinking about definite descriptions and, since his analysis is quantificational, rather than referential, it adequately solves the three puzzles that Russell highlights as being a problem for other theories. Of course, this does not entail that there could not be a better theory of descriptions than Russell has put forward, but I do not think that one has been formulated as yet. I would argue that the objections to Russell's theory are not strong enough to undermine it.
Russell's theory of descriptions is formulated to try and overcome the problems faced by Proper-Name treatments of descriptions, such as Frege's. According to Russell, definite descriptions are quantifying phrases which do not refer to one particular thing. This helps to explain how we can think about things we are not acquainted with (like the point at the centre of the earth). The main problem with theories such as Meinong's and Frege's is that, in cases where a denoting phrase has no denotation, such as in the proposition 'The King of France is bald', Meinong and Frege have to find a denotation in order to support their theories. However, Russell takes a different course and decides to abandon the notion that denotation is what we are concerned with in propositions containing denoting phrases altogether.
Russell makes a clear distinction between names and descriptions and states that a name has to refer whereas descriptions are not referring expressions (This explains why existence can only be significantly asserted of descriptions, since a name can only be used if it refers to something that exists). Russell comes up with four main differences between descriptions and names:
Firstly, we understand descriptions by understanding the words they are made up of, whereas understanding names requires acquaintance with their denotation, since they are simple symbols and do not contain any parts that are symbols. Secondly, we can assign a name purely by stipulation but this is not the case for descriptions (ie. no stipulation can make 'the author of Waverley' denote Scott). Thirdly, Russell states that, "If one thing has two names, you can make exactly the same assertion whichever of the two names you use". But as we saw in the discussion of Frege, there is a cognitive difference between saying 'A = A' and 'A = B'. So Russell makes a distinction between logically proper names (the words 'this' and 'that') and ordinary proper names (for example 'Socrates', 'Descartes' etc.). Fourthly, you cannot say 'John does not exist' because a proper name has to refer, whereas you can say 'The so-and-so does not exist'.
Russell claims that:
"Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning".
So Russell's analysis of the sentence 'The so-and-so is F' would consist of these three parts:
(1) There is at least one so-and-so
(2) There is at most one so-and-so
(3) Whatever is a so-and-so is F
Or, to put it more concisely:
There is exactly one so-and-so and it is F
(Of course, it is important that the word 'the' does not occur in the analysis) So, for example, the sentence, 'The earth is round' would be false if there is less than one earth (in the specified domain), or if there is more than one earth, or if there is exactly one earth and it is not round; otherwise it will be true.
Russell's whole theory rests on his assumption that the only difference between indirect descriptions (phrases starting with 'a') and definite descriptions (phrases starting with 'the') is that the latter implies uniqueness. The analysis of 'The so-and-so exists' is slightly different, because 'exists' is not a predicate according to Russell. That sentence would be analysed thus:
(1) There is at least one so-and-so
(2) There is at most one so-and-so
(or, 'There is exactly one so-and-so)
In his paper entitled 'On Denoting', Russell gives three puzzles which would pose a problem to a Proper-Names theorist, but which he claims his theory can solve. The first puzzle is that of the Law of Identity, which states that if a is identical with b, then whatever is true of a is also true of the b. Russell shows how we could be led to a false statement by way of the Law of Identity if we start with the assumption that 'Scott is the author of Waverley' is an identity statement. If we take 'a' to stand for 'Scott' and 'b' to stand for 'the author of Waverley', and the predicate 'F' to stand for 'George IV wanted to know whether he was the author of Waverley', we can formulate the following argument:
| a = b | Scott is the author of Waverley |
| Fa | George IV wanted to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley |
| Fb | George IV wanted to know whether the author of Waverley was the author of Waverley |
The conclusion of this argument is obviously false and yet it logically follows from the premises, so in order to avoid the unwanted conclusion Russell denies that the premise ('Scott is the author of Waverley) is an identity statement. He claims that an identity statement can only be formed by connecting two simple symbols. So the statement, 'Scott was the author of Waverley' becomes 'One and only one entity wrote Waverley and Scott was identical with that one. This statement does not contain any constituent 'the author of Waverley' for which we could substitute 'Scott' and so the puzzle is solved.
The second puzzle concerns the Law of the Excluded Middle, which holds that either 'A is B' or 'A is not B' is always true. But the following statements both seem intuitively to be false:
(a) The King of France is bald
(b) The King of France is not bald
Russell says that if you list all the bald people and you list all the not bald people, you will not find the King of France in either list (this is obviously because there is no such person as the King of France) Russell claims that this problem arises because of an ambiguity of scope and he makes the distinction between primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases. The difference is where the negation comes in the sentence. The primary reading of sentence (b) would be:
'There is one entity which is now the King of France and is not bald'
and the secondary reading would be:
'It is false that there is an entity which is now the King of France and is bald'
So the correct negation of the first statement should be:
(c) It is not the case that the King of France is bald (ie. It is not the case that there is exactly one King of France and he is bald). Hence, Russell's theory comes up with an intuitively appealing solution because statement (a) is false but statement (c) is true.
The third puzzle is the problem of how a non-entity can be the subject of a proposition. Meinong (and others) have argued that there are unreal objects (eg. unicorns), but Russell argues that logic is concerned with the real world and therefore this approach is a mistake. So non-entities being the subjects of propositions are not a problem for Russell as, under his theory, denoting phrases are regarded as quantifiers, rather than as referring phrases.
I will now briefly discuss some objections to Russell's theory, which are all based on the idea that definite descriptions have a referential role at least some of the time. The first objection is to Russell's claim that the word 'the' only differs from the word 'a' in that the word 'the' implies uniqueness. It is argued that the definite description does not necessarily imply uniqueness. For example, if someone said, 'The table is wobbly' in a room with two tables, then it would not be true to say that there is exactly one table and whatever is a table is wobbly. However, Russell argues that the domain of quantifiers can be modified by the context. It is also clear that we often use the word 'the' when it would be better to say 'that'. I would argue that in this example, the speaker is using the language incorrectly when he says 'the table' and it would be much more appropriate to say 'that table' to pick out the individual table he is talking about. Another objection, made by Strawson is that when someone says 'The present King of France is bald' the speaker does not succeed in saying anything true or false. However, I would argue that it is false because there isn't a King of France to which the predicate 'is bald' can be applied. In reply to the above statement, someone would not say 'No the King of France isn't bald'.
I think Russell's account captures a correct analysis. Donnellan makes an objection on the grounds of a distinction between the attributive and referential sense of the definite description. The attributive usage is not intended to refer to anyone, whereas the referential usage is intended to refer to someone in particular. An instance of the attributive use would be someone saying, upon seeing Smith's blood-stained body, 'The murderer of Smith is insane', without knowing who actually murdered him. Whereas someone uttering the same sentence in court knowing that Jones murdered Smith and meaning to say that Jones is insane would be employing the referential use. However I do not consider this to be an effective criticism because a Russellian would make a clear distinction between what someone literally said and what they meant. Peacocke argues that there can be 'entity-invoking' uses of a definite description, which are instances where the description is used referentially. If Peacocke can show that the word 'the' can be used in the same way as the word 'that' (a logically proper name) he would be able to show the existence of entity-invoking uses of the description. However, he cannot show that they are equivalent and therefore this is not an effective criticism of Russell's theory either.
To conclude I would argue that Russell's theory successfully overcomes the problems that do not seem to be solved by Proper-Name theories such as those of Frege and Meinong and none of the objections to Russell's theory are strong enough to undermine it.
© Anne Witton 1996. No part of this article may be copied without my permission.
